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Producers’ Yield and Yield Risk: Perceptions versus Reality 
and Crop Insurance Use 
 
Abstract 
Using survey data from 258 Illinois corn farmers, we investigate the relationship between 
subjective and objective yield measures and their effect on the use of crop insurance.  
Our findings show that producers view themselves as better than average with respect to 
yields and in terms of their variability, and that over- and underconfidence also influence 
their use of crop insurance.  The effects are not symmetric, overconfidence is primarily 
reflected in the larger-than-average yield, while underconfidence emerges mainly in the 
larger-than-average variability.  Crop insurance use is further affected by risk 
preferences and county yield variability. 
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Producers’ Yield and Yield Risk: Perceptions versus Reality 
and Crop Insurance Use 
Successful risk management is important for the long-term economic survival of farms, 
and various instruments exist in the market place for that purpose.  Futures and options 
markets allow farmers to transfer price risk, whereas crop insurance provides protection 
from production risk.  Despite the appealing benefits of these instruments, the use of 
futures markets among producers is limited and participation in crop insurance programs 
low unless heavily subsidized (Makki and Somwaru 2001; Sherrick et al. 2004a).  
Although the economic literature proposes several explanations for this behavior, 
producers’ subjective expectations and psychological factors have received little 
attention.  Yet, how individuals perceive yields, risk, and risk preferences can strongly 
influence their decision-making behavior and subsequent choice of whether or not to use 
particular instruments.  A farmer who perceives his subjective yield and yield risk 
differently from its objective reality, might assign a lower than actuarially fair value to a 
particular risk management tool and avoid its use even if it is in his economic advantage.  
Such incongruence between subjective and objective measures may lead to suboptimal 
decisions at the farm-level, and consequently high costs to society in form of excessive 
farm subsidies (LaFrance et al. 2000; Hayes et al. 2003) and government emergency 
payments. 
The paper evaluates the subjective yield and yield risk expectations of Illinois 
corn producers.  By contrasting farmers’ subjective expectations to objective measures, 
our study seeks to identify whether areas of incongruence exist, as well as their potential 
magnitude and direction.  We also assess how risk aversion and yield perceptions   3
influence the choice to buy crop insurance.  An understanding of these relationships is 
critical for several reasons.  First, including risk and subjective yield perceptions extends 
and complements the existing body of research on the use of crop insurance in an 
important dimension (Mahul and Wright 2003; Sherrick et. al. 2004a).  Second, a greater 
insights into the factors that affect decision making is an important prerequisite for 
designing suitable risk management tools that could lead to more effective producer 
decisions, and ultimately to lower subsidies and government payments.  Finally, an 
understanding of farmers’ subjective yield distributions is also essential for extension 
agents who can conduct programs to better educate farmers and make recommendations 
for the use of risk management instruments. 
 
Literature 
The recent body of research that examines producers’ subjective perceptions is small.  
Bessler (1980) aggregates producer subjective yield information elicited in probability 
form to examine their relationship to county yields.  He examines one-period ahead 
ARIMA-forecasts generated from historical yields and finds them to be consistent with 
the aggregated yield distributions in the mean but not at higher moments.  Aggregate 
subjective distributions are also examined by Eales at al. (1990), who focus on grain price 
forecasts by different groups of market participants.  The means of the elicited 
distributions correspond in most cases to subsequent futures prices, but the variability 
severely underestimated market volatility.  In contrast to Bessler (1980) and Eales et al. 
(1990), Pease (1992) assesses disaggregated subjective yield expectations of Kentucky 
corn and soybean farmers.  He reports that one-period ahead forecasts expressed as the   4
distributions’ implied means were slightly above for soybeans, but somewhat below for 
corn the linearly de-trended historical yields for each farm.  In most cases, producers 
tended to understate yield risks.  In short research indicates that elicited producer 
distributions provide rather accurate representations of objective mean prices and yields, 
but fall short for higher moments. 
  Recent literature from finance has identified cases where the incongruence 
between subjective perceptions and observed measures can influence behavior.  The 
notion of overconfidence has emerged as the key concept, where overconfidence has 
been defined in various ways, including a miscalibration between subjective and 
objective distributions, optimism, and better than the average.  Optimism, and better than 
the average are the two definitions most consistent with the common use of the term 
“overconfident,” and the better-than-average effect is the most straightforward and 
easiest to explain and implement.  In a decision context, the better-than-average effect 
simply says that most individuals perceive themselves to possess superior skills and 
ability to handle difficult situations which they think will translate into improved 
outcomes relative to the rest.  Research has shown for example that more confident 
market participants trade more frequently even if their returns fail to beat the market 
average (Barber and Odean 2000).  In agriculture, different signs of overconfidence have 
been observed.  For example, both Eales at al. (1990) and Pease (1992) find that Illinois 
and Kentucky corn producers understated price and yield risks. 
  In a related context, several authors have investigated farmers’ use of crop 
insurance and identified factors that influence participation rates (Goodwin 1993; Coble 
et al. 1996; Smith and Baquet 1996; Sherrick et al. 2004a).  Among these factors, farm   5
size and yield variability have been found to have a positive and significant impact on the 
decision to buy crop insurance.  In contrast, behavioral characteristics such as 
overconfidence and risk attitude have received substantially less attention.  Sherrick et al. 
(2004a), for example, measure producers’ perspectives on the importance of risk 
management in a survey of Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana corn and soybean farmers.  Their 
results show that the type of insurance (hail/revenue) depends on the importance 
producers assign to risk management.  However, no research appears to exist on the 
impact of overconfidence on the use of crop insurance.  This seems somewhat strange 
because subjective and objective yield distributions are at the heart of the crop insurance 
question.  Objective yield distributions basically determine the fair market value of 
insurance premiums.  But even if insurance premiums are actuarial fair, there is little 
motivation for producers to use insurance if their subjective yield distributions are not 
congruent with the fair market value of insurance, particularly if their distributions are 
more confident of high yields.  An understanding of how perceptions and risk attitudes 
relate to the use of crop insurance is important not only for designing insurance and other 
risk management instruments that will be adopted with a high likelihood but also for 
extension personal who educate farmers in the use of these tools.  The question that 
emerges from this brief literature is—Are agricultural producers overconfident about 
their yields?  If overconfidence exists, does it influence agricultural producer behavior, 
particularly with regard to the use of crop of insurance? 
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Survey 
Illinois corn farmers were surveyed to develop their subjective yield and yield risk 
perceptions at farm meetings in the first quarter of 2003 and 2004.  Participation in the 
survey was voluntary and unassisted.  The instrument included questions on the farm’s 
primary farm location in the state (county), size of operation (acres), perceived historical 
yields, use of crop insurance, and seven Likert-scale measures of risk attitude.  The 
complete survey instrument is displayed in the appendix. 
The subjective yield information was elicited in several formats.  Using a direct 
and open-ended question, producers’ average corn yields were obtained by simply asking 
them to estimate their yield per acre in a typical year.  The producers were then asked to 
compare their performance to other producers in the county by indicating whether their 
operation achieved higher, lower, or similar yields and experienced more, less, or similar 
yield variability.  The survey also asked producers to describe their yield distribution by 
assigning probabilities into ten predefined yield categories (Figure 1).  The procedure is 
similar to those used by Bessler (1980) and Eales et al. (1990), but does not restrict the 
size of the weights – here probabilities—allowing more flexibility.  To obtain 
information about farmers’ risk attitudes we use a seven-dimensional Likert-scale 
framework.  With the exception of a few minor modifications in wording to reflect the 
context of this study, the questions are identical to those asked by Pennings and Garcia 
(2001) and who report significant factor loadings and good construct reliability.  Finally, 
the survey asked producers whether they had purchased crop insurance. 
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Methods 
Yields 
The survey elicited two subjective measures of the producer’s own yields, a directly-
stated average corn yield in a typical year and an indirectly-stated yield based on the 
probability assignment task.  The probability assignments were used to recover the 
farmer’s subjective yield distribution which permitted us to infer its implied mean and 
standard deviation.  By converting the discrete probabilities to a continuous distribution 
function, we allow for a greater degree of flexibility in determining the implied mean 
yield than by simply summing the weighted category mid-points. 
  Using equation (1), 
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each producer’s yield distribution is recovered separately by minimizing the sum of 
squared differences between the stated probabilities and the fitted probabilities across all 
ten yield intervals.  Here, pij denotes the stated probability of producer i for interval j, Uj 
refers to the upper bound of the interval, and D(.) is the cumulative distribution of farm-
level yields.  D(.) is assumed to be the same for all producers.  Following Pichon (2002) 
and Sherrick et al. (2004b) who conducted extensive analyses of alternative distributions, 
its functional form is specified in equation (2) as a Weibull distribution, 
(2) 
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Solving (1) for  i θ  provides a set of i two-dimensional parameter vectors ( i α ,  i β ), one for 
each participant, which is then used in equation (3),   8
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to obtain producer i’s implied mean yield  i μ . 
The objective yield, i.e. the yield of a typical farm in a respondent’s county, is 
computed as the average yield in that county.  To calculate objective yields, historic 
yields are first de-trended to remove the effect of systematic increases due to changes in 
technology.  Following Pease (1992) and Sherrick et al. (2004b), a linear trend model in 
equation (4) is used.  Because yields have not increased in similar fashion throughout the 
state, each county’s yield data are de-trended separately to 2002 and 2003 levels using 
(4)  () ,, adj ct org ct c YY y e a r t γ =+ − ,  2002,2003 year =  
 
where, Yadj,ct is county c’s yield in year t adjusted to 2002 (2003) levels and  c γ , is the 
slope coefficient from regressing county c’s original yields Yorg,ct on a linear time trend, t 
= 1972, …, 2002 (2003). 
 
Risk 
A producer’s complete risk profile is characterized by both risk perception and risk 
attitude.  Risk attitude is measured by the responses to the seven Likert-scale questions.  
In order to ensure that larger values consistently correspond to greater risk aversion, the 
scores assigned to questions 2-4 are reversed (see appendix).  Each participant’s degree 
of risk aversion is then computed as a single value by averaging individual scores from 
questions 7.1-7.7.   9
For the same respondent i a corresponding measure of risk perception ( i σ ) is 
obtained as the implied standard deviation of the fitted distribution using the parameter 
vector ( i α ,  i β ) from equations (1) and (2), and (5), 
(5)  () ( )
2
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where Γ is the gamma function.  Finally, county risk is computed as the standard 
deviation of the de-trended county yields.
1 
 
Incongruent subjective and objective distributions 
We are concerned with identifying the relationship between subjective and objective 
yield distributions and the possible effects on crop insurance decisions.  To measure these 
differences we use producer perceptions/statements to identify how their corn yield and 
its variability compared to other producers in the county.  We also examine the 
relationship between their stated perceptions of yields, indirectly-stated yields, and 
county yields.  Previous agricultural research suggests that indirectly-stated yields will 
differ from directly-stated yields and will be close to county yields (Egelkraut, et al. 
2006; Pease 1992).  We then relate the perceptions to insurance use. 
 
Crop insurance use 
The influence of overconfidence, producer risk attitudes, and their characteristics on the 
use of crop insurance is examined using equations (6) and (7).  Equation (6) is specified 
                                                 
1 The standard deviation is used to reflect variability because it is easier to interpret than variance and 
consistent with Pease’s (1992) use of coefficients of variation.   10
in the most conventional context of overconfidence which suggests that an agent’s 
actions are influenced by the perception that their outcomes are better than average in 
mean and variability.  However, in equation (7) since we are looking at the producers 
buying crop insurance for protection against adverse weather events, we examine the 
effect of underconfidence as well.  This context suggests that producers in search of 
protection will purchase of insurance when expected yields are less than average and 
manifest higher variability.  In both equations we include producer risk attitude, actual 
county yield variability, and farm size. 
Equation (6) specifies crop insurance use in a logit framework, 
[ ]
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where ci(i) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a producer purchased crop 
insurance and 0 otherwise, RA is the producer’s risk attitude measure, CSTD the standard 
deviation of the de-trended county yields, and SIZE is farm size.  The remaining three 
(binary) variables are designed to capture producer’s overconfidence.  LV takes a value of 
1 if a producer perceives his yield variability to be less than other farms in the county and 
0 otherwise, and HY is assigned a value of 1 if the producer viewed his yield as higher 
than the county average and 0 otherwise.  LVH Y × is an interaction term which allows 
for a differential effect for more confident, better than average producers. 
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Here, MV is a binary variable takes a value of 1 if a producer perceived his yield as more 
variable than typical in his county and 0 otherwise, and LY is a binary variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the producer thought his yields are lower than those of others in the 
county.  MVL Y × is an interaction term which allows for a differential effect for less 
confident, less than average producers. 
 
Survey Data, Results and Discussion 
Survey data 
The farm meetings yielded 134 and 194 completed surveys in 2003 and 2004, 
corresponding to a response rate of about 50% of the participants present.  Excluding 
non-farmers (e.g. bankers), out-of-state responses and incomplete or inconsistent
2 
questionnaires, the final sample was 112 surveys in 2003 and 146 in 2004 (table 1).  The 
producers operated relatively large farms with an average of approximately 1211 (2003) 
and 1347 (2004) acres which is representative of commercial scale farms in the Corn 
Belt.  No spatial concentration was detected among the responses.  The participating 
producers represented 69 different Illinois counties and no county accounted for more 
than 16 surveys (6.2%) in the final sample. 
Based on equation (3) and (5), producer’s implied mean yield and implied 
standard deviation are computed.  The objective county measures that correspond to these 
subjective yield and yield risk estimates are obtained by first de-trending the NASS 
county yields over the 1972-2002 (2003) period (equation 4) and then computing the 
arithmetic averages of the adjusted yields Yadj,ct , t = 1972, …, 2002 (2003), for each 
                                                 
2 Surveys with rounding or summing errors that were 10% or less were retained in the sample and rescaled 
(e.g. if the assigned probabilities summed to 102%, then divide each individual entry by 102%).   12
county c. Examining independence of subjective yield and yield risk in a regression 
framework, we detect no significant relationships (results not displayed).  Finally, testing 
for construct reliability, i.e. the degree to which questions 7.1-7.7 can be considered as 
measuring the single latent variable, risk attitude, we find that the risk scores display 
good reliability (Cronbach’s α =0.726) and hence are aggregated into a single score. 
 
Relative and absolute yield and yield risk perceptions 
Producer’s assessments of their individual yields and yield variability relative to those of 
a typical farm in their county are summarized in table 2.  The majority of the participants 
perceived their yields to be higher (46.1%) or similar (42.3%) to those of other farms in 
their county and only 11.6% thought they experienced lower yields.  Similarly, most 
producers viewed their yields as less variable (41.5%), or similar (38.4%) and only 
20.1% indicated that they experienced greater yield variability than typical in their 
county.  Hence farmers seem confident regarding their yields, with a “better-than-
average” perception, and yield risk. 
  This “better-than-average” effect is also reflected in producer’s direct yield 
statements (table 3).  Their directly-stated average yield is 153.43 bu/ac, 7.18 bu/ac 
higher than the NASS county average and 7.75 bu/ac higher than the average producer 
implied mean yield.  When examined with the Wilcoxon signed rank test, a paired non-
parametric test that does not require assumptions about the form of the distribution of 
observations, both differences are significant (p<0.001 and p<0.001).  In contrast, no 
significant difference (p=0.838) is found between the Weibull implied mean yield 
(145.68 bu/ac) and the county average yield (146.25 bu/ac).  These findings are robust   13
when the 2003 and 2004 surveys are examined separately and when county yields are 
computed based on only the more recent yield observations of the post-1988 period.  
Upward-biases of the direct open-ended question format have also been reported by 
Champ and Bishop (2001) and Ready et al. (2001) in contingent valuation analyses.  The 
results also agree with Bessler (1980) and Eales et al. (1990), who find that aggregate 
elicited probabilities provide reasonably accurate descriptions of objective mean yields 
and prices. 
Overconfidence is also observed in producers’ implied standard deviation.  For 
the entire sample the average farmer perceived standard deviation (19.12 bu/ac) is 
significantly smaller than the average county standard deviation (20.31 bu/ac) when 
examined with the Wilcoxon signed rank test (p=0.012).  To assess the sensitivity of this 
finding to decreases in yield variability post-1988—a period characterized by fewer 
adverse weather events—and to examine the notion that perceptions are often based on 
more recent information (Wyer and Srull 1981; Kahnemann, Slovic and Tversky 1982), 
we evaluate the same hypothesis using the observed variability during the most recent 
period.  We find that the post-1988 county standard deviation decreases to 17.75 bu/ac 
which is smaller than the Weibull implied risk, but the difference is not significant 
(p=0.197).  Because positive and negative deviations from the county mean yield should 
at least partially offset each other within the county, individual farm-level variability is 
expected to exceed the variability of average county yields.  Our results suggest that the 
surveyed producers seem to understate actual yield variability, a finding consistent with 
Eales et al. (1990) and Pease (1992). 
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Crop insurance use 
The results from different specifications of equations (6) and (7) appear in tables 4 and 5.  
The pseudo R
2s (McFadden’s R
2s) are low across all of the specifications, but the 
likelihood ratio tests are significant at conventional levels.  Across all specifications risk 
attitude and the standard deviation of county yields have a positive and significant effect 
on the use of crop insurance.  Their estimated coefficients and levels of statistical 
significance appear to be quite stable.  For example, in table 4 greater risk aversion 
increases a farmer’s probability of buying crop insurance (RA=0.052, p=0.013), and 
producers in counties with greater yield variability are also more likely to buy insurance 
(CSTD=0.033, p=0.000).  Larger farm size also had a positive impact on the use of crop 
insurance (SIZE=0.002), but the effect was not statistically significant (p = 0.164). 
The effects of the over-and underconfidence variables are not symmetric in the 
two formulations.  In the overconfidence specification, larger than average perceived 
yields have a negative effect on the use of crop insurance.  In the underconfidence 
specification, larger than average perceived variability increases the use of crop 
insurance.  However, in both cases, the marginal probabilities are small and quite similar 
in size but opposite in sign (HY=-0.134 (A) and -0.088 (B); MV=0.110 (A) and 0.120 
(B)).  In contrast, the other over- and underconfidence variables never enter significantly. 
The results suggest that producers who viewed their yields as better than average 
are also less likely to buy crop insurance, while producers who perceive their variability 
to be larger than average are more likely to buy insurance.  This last result also seems 
quite compatible with a more traditional risk perspective and is highly consistent with the 
significant risk preference and county yield variables in both specifications.  To   15
investigate whether the magnitude of producers’ larger-than-average yield (variability) 
perceptions influenced their likelihood of using crop insurance, we multiplied in the 
overconfidence specification the binary mean variable by the difference between 
producers’ directly-stated and county mean yields, and in the underconfidence 
specification the binary variance variable by the implied standard deviation from the 
Weibull.  Eliminating variables with non-significant coefficients, we find only a marginal 
change in the results (compare B to C in both table 4 and 5). 
Overall, the empirical estimates suggest that the use of crop insurance is affected 
by the combined effect of risk preferences, the yield risk across counties, and producer 
perceptions of larger-than-average yields and variability.  The effect of yield risk across 
counties is consistent with previous literature, but our findings represent the first 
evidence of significant risk preferences effects and producer over- or underconfidence on 
insurance use.  While the findings appear rather stable and statistically significant, it is 
important to note that the magnitudes of the effects are not large. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Using survey data from 258 Illinois corn farmers in 2003 and 2004, we investigate the 
relationship between subjective and objective yield measures and their effect on the use 
of crop insurance.  Based on the answers of Illinois corn producers to questions about 
their farm-level yields and their perceived relative performance compared to others, we 
find that producers think of themselves as better-than-average with respect to yields and 
in terms of their variability.  A difference between directly-stated yields and average 
county yields exists, but when probabilistic yield distributions are elicited the difference   16
between producer and average county yields practically disappears.  These findings are 
consistent with Egelkraut et al (2006), and with Bessler (1981) and Eales et al (1991) 
who report that probabilistic elicitation of random variables provides a good 
representation of the objective means.  With regards to the variability, we find that 
producers’ yield standard deviations generally understate the actual yield variability in 
the county. 
Crop insurance use is affected by risk preferences, county yield variability, and 
measures of over- and underconfidence.  The effects of the risk preferences and county 
yield variability are highly stable across various specifications, while the effects of the 
over- and underconfidence variables are not symmetric.  The effect of overconfidence is 
primarily reflected in the larger-than-average yield, while the effect of underconfidence 
emerges mainly in the larger-than-average variability.  The underconfidence effect seems 
quite compatible with a more traditional risk perspective and is highly consistent with the 
significant risk preference and county yield variables.  On balance, the statistical findings 
appear rather robust, but the magnitudes of the probability effects do not appear large.  
The magnitude of the marginal effects may have been somewhat limited by the large 
number of producers in the sample who already use crop insurance perhaps as a function 
of other factors including high government subsidies.  We therefore encourage future 
researchers to investigate the impact of overconfidence on other producer decisions and 
for crop insurance use in different contexts. 
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Table 1. Number of Usable Survey Responses and Producer Farm Size  
Farm size  Survey 









represented county  acre acre 
2003  112  48    8  1211    925 
2004 146  59  10  1347  1000 




Table 2. Producers’ Perceived Average Yield and Yield Variability Relative to a Typical 
Farm in Their County 
Survey 
year 













 %  %  %  % %  % 
2003 42.0  47.3  10.7  41.1  38.4  20.5 
2004 49.3  38.4  12.3  41.8  38.4  19.9 




a Significantly greater than zero at p<0.050 (*), p<0.010 (**) and p<0.001 (***). 
Table 3. Producers’ Perceived Average Yield, Weibull Implied Mean Yield and Yield of 



























  bu/ac bu/ac bu/ac bu/ac  bu/ac  bu/ac 
2003 151.45  141.95  143.66  143.60  7.84
*** 7.78
*** 
2004 154.95  146.22  147.23  148.28  6.67
*** 7.72
*** 
All 153.43  144.37  145.68  146.25  7.18
*** 7.75
***   20
 
Table 4. Overconfidence and crop insurance use (2003 and 2004, n=258). 











































   -0.088 
(0.046) 






   -0.005
d 
(0.057) 
 83.33  0.098  22.97 
(0.000) 
a The values displayed are the marginal effects at the means of the independent variables. 
b The values in parentheses are the p-values of the estimated coefficients. 
c The likelihood ratio test follows a Chi-square distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k corresponds to the number of 
independent variables in the regression.  The test examines the hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero. 
d Here, the variable takes a value equal to the difference between producers’ directly-stated and county mean yields for those 
respondents who stated their yields were higher than average when compared to others, and zero for respondents who viewed their 
yields as lower than average or about the same.   21
 
a The values displayed are the marginal effects at the means of the independent variables. 
b The values in parentheses are the p-values of the estimated coefficients. 
c The likelihood ratio test follows a Chi-square distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k corresponds to the number of 
independent variables in the regression.  The test examines the hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero. 
d Here, the variable takes a value equal to the producers’ Weibull implied standard deviation for those respondents who stated their 
yield variability was greater than average when compared to others, and zero for respondents who viewed their yield variability as 
lower than average or about the same.
Table 5. Underconfidence and crop insurance use (2003 and 2004, n=258). 
Model  Producer characteristics  Subjective perceptions   
















































   0.008
d 
(0.017) 
   82.95  0.116  27.38 
(0.000)   22
 
Figure 1. Assigned producer yield probabilities and their fitted Weibull yield distribution.   23
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